



University of Pittsburgh

School of  
Computing and Information



LERSAIS The Laboratory for Education and  
Research on Security Assured Information Systems

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# ***CryptoNN: Training Neural Networks over Encrypted Data***


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# Background

## Cloud-based ML Service



## Special Scenario, e.g., Small Clinics - Computer Aided Diagnostic Application

### Challenges

Limited IT infrastructure and AI resources/experts


v.s.

Privacy-sensitive data – e.g., patients' electronic healthcare records

## How to train a ML model without leaking privacy-sensitive data using cloud-based ML service ?

# Background

*How existing privacy-preserving ML approaches work in cloud-based service*



## **Privacy-Preserving Approaches**

### ❖ Noise Addition

- Differential Privacy, e.g., deep learning with differential privacy.

### ❖ Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC)

- “non-crypto” based approach – garbled circuit (GC) + oblivious transfer (OT), e.g., DeepSecure, etc.
- “crypto” based approach – homomorphic encryption (HE), e.g., CryptoNets, etc.

# Background

## *Adoption of Privacy-Preserving Approaches in ML Cloud : Trade-off Issue*

### ❖ Noise Addition

- Differential Privacy

} trade-off : privacy v.s. utility

### ❖ Secure Multiparty Computation (SMC)

- “non-crypto” based approach – GC + OT
- “crypto” based approach – HE

} trade-off : computation v.s. transmission

} require large transmission volume

} require higher computation time  
--only support prediction phase

# Comparison of Privacy-preserving ML Approaches

COMPARISON OF PRIVACY-PRESERVING APPROACHES IN MACHINE LEARNING MODELS

Proposed Work	Training	Prediction	Privacy <sup>▷</sup>	ML Model	Approach
Privacy-Preserving Deep Learning (CCS) [7]	●	○	○	Deep Learning	Distributed*
Deep Learning with differential privacy (CCS) [8]	●	○	○	Deep Learning	Differential Privacy <sup>◇</sup>
CryptoML [4]	●	●	◐	Matrix-based ML	Delegation <sup>‡</sup>
SecureML [6]	●	●	◐	General	Secure Protocol (SMC)
DeepSecure [5]	●	●	◐	Deep Learning	Secure Protocol (Garbled Circuits)
CryptoNets [3], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15]	○	●	●	Covers All	Homomorphic Encryption (HE)
ML classification over encrypted data (NDSS) [2]	○	●	●	Limited ML <sup>†</sup>	HE + Secure Protocol
CryptoNN (our work)	●	●	●	Neural Networks	Functional Encryption

<sup>▷</sup> This column indicates the privacy strength/guarantee such as mild approach ○ (e.g. differential privacy) and strong guarantee ● (e.g. crypto system).

<sup>†</sup> It only supports Hyperplane Decision, Nave Bayes, and Decision Trees models.

<sup>‡</sup> The data owner trains the model by itself and outsources partial computation in a privacy-preserving setting.


\* The model is trained in a distributed manner where each data owner trains a partial model on their private data.

<sup>◇</sup> It applies differential privacy method on the training data.

# CryptoNN in Cloud-based ML Service

## How CryptoNN works in cloud-based ML service


Cloud/Server based ML (as a Service) -- Clients



# Functional Encryption

In traditional encryptions scheme, *decryption algorithm reveals all or nothing*

In FE, for a function  $f(\cdot)$ , the decryption key  $sk_f$  only reveals partial information, i.e.,  $f(x)$  instead of  $x$ .




# Functional Encryption -- Inner-Product

$$f(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \langle \mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y} \rangle = \sum_{i=1}^n (x_i \cdot y_i)$$

Alice has  $\mathbf{x}$ , and Bob has  $\mathbf{y}$ .

Goal:

Let Bob know the result of  $f(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y})$ ,  
but is not able to learn  $\mathbf{x}$ .



Abdalla, Michel, et al. "Simple functional encryption schemes for inner products." IACR International Workshop on Public Key Cryptography (PKC 2015). Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2015.



# Secure Matrix Computation

Two Parties

$$X_{l \times n}, Y_{n \times m}, \text{ s.t. } n > m$$

Alice

$$\begin{bmatrix} x_{11} & \cdots & x_{1n} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ x_{l1} & \cdots & x_{ln} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$X_{l \times n}$$

$$ct_1 \leftarrow \text{enc}(x_1)$$

$$ct_l \leftarrow \text{enc}(x_l)$$

$$\text{enc}(X) = (ct_1, \dots, ct_l)$$

Bob

$$\begin{bmatrix} y_{11} & \cdots & y_{1m} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ y_{n1} & \cdots & y_{nm} \end{bmatrix}$$


$$sk_{f_1}$$

$$sk_{f_m}$$

$$Y_{n \times m}$$

$$sk_{f,Y} = (sk_{f_1}, \dots, sk_{f_m})$$

Decryption



Computation

$$\text{dec}(ct_1, sk_{f_1})$$


$$\text{dec}(ct_1, sk_{f_m})$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} z_{11} & \cdots & z_{1m} \\ \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ z_{l1} & \cdots & z_{lm} \end{bmatrix}$$

$$\text{dec}(ct_l, sk_{f_m})$$

$$XY_{l \times m}$$

# Neural Networks - Gradient Descent



$$A^{[1]} = g(Z^{[1]}), Z^{[1]} = W^{[1]}X + b^{[1]}$$

$$A^{[2]} = g(Z^{[2]}), Z^{[2]} = W^{[2]}A^{[1]} + b^{[2]}$$

... ..

$$A^{[l-1]} = g(Z^{[l-1]}), Z^{[l-1]} = W^{[l-1]}A^{[l-2]} + b^{[l-1]}$$

$$A^{[l]} = g(Z^{[l]}), Z^{[l]} = W^{[l]}A^{[l-1]} + b^{[l]}$$

$$\hat{Y} = A^{[l]}$$


$$E = \frac{1}{n} \sum_i^n (\hat{y}^{(i)} - y^{(i)})^2 \quad g(z) = \frac{1}{1 + e^{-z}}$$

$$W^{[l]} = W^{[l]} - \alpha \frac{\partial E}{\partial W^{[l]}}$$

$$\frac{\partial E}{\partial W^{[l]}} = \frac{\partial E}{\partial A^{[l]}} \frac{\partial A^{[l]}}{\partial Z^{[l]}} \frac{\partial Z^{[l]}}{\partial W^{[l]}}$$

$$\frac{\partial Z}{\partial W^{[l]}} = A^{[l-1]}, \frac{\partial Z}{\partial Z^{[l]}} = A^{[l]}(1 - A^{[l]}), \frac{\partial Z}{\partial Z^{[l]}} = A^{[l]} - Y$$

# Neural Networks meet Functional Encryption



$$\mathbf{A}^{[1]} = g(\mathbf{Z}^{[1]}), \mathbf{Z}^{[1]} = \mathbf{W}^{[1]} \mathbf{X} + \mathbf{b}^{[1]}$$

$$\begin{bmatrix} \square & \square & \square \\ \square & \square & \square \\ \square & \square & \square \end{bmatrix} \cdot \begin{bmatrix} \square & \square & \square \\ \square & \square & \square \\ \square & \square & \square \end{bmatrix} \xrightarrow[\text{key}]{\text{Dec}} \begin{bmatrix} \square & \square & \square \\ \square & \square & \square \\ \square & \square & \square \end{bmatrix}$$

$\mathbf{W}^{[1]} \quad \text{Enc}(\mathbf{X}) \quad \text{Dec} \quad \mathbf{W}^{[1]} \mathbf{X}$

Secure Matrix Computation


$$\mathbf{W}^{[l]} = \mathbf{W}^{[l]} - \alpha \frac{\partial E}{\partial \mathbf{W}^{[l]}}$$

$$\frac{\partial E}{\partial \mathbf{W}^{[l]}} = \frac{\partial E}{\partial \mathbf{A}^{[l]}} \frac{\partial \mathbf{A}^{[l]}}{\partial \mathbf{Z}^{[l]}} \frac{\partial \mathbf{Z}^{[l]}}{\partial \mathbf{W}^{[l]}}$$

$$\frac{\partial \mathbf{Z}^{[l]}}{\partial \mathbf{W}^{[l]}} = \mathbf{A}^{[l-1]}, \frac{\partial \mathbf{Z}^{[l]}}{\partial \mathbf{Z}^{[l]}} = \mathbf{A}^{[l]} (1 - \mathbf{A}^{[l]}), \frac{\partial \mathbf{Z}^{[l]}}{\partial \mathbf{Z}^{[l]}} = \mathbf{A}^{[l]} - \mathbf{Y}$$


FE for Basic Operations or Garbled Labels

# CryptoNN – Framework Overview




# Experimental Evaluation

- Prototype Implementation
  - A scratch implementation of LeNet-5 in Python
  - *FE scheme implementation*
    - Charm-crypto (Python) – underlying numerical calculations rely on GMP library (C)
- Test platform
  - *Intel Core i7/16GB/macOS*




# Experimental Evaluation


## Time cost of dot-product in secure matrix computation




(a) pre-processing for encryption



(b) pre-processing for function key



(c) secure dot-product computation



(d) secure dot-product (parallelized)


x-axis: the element size  
y-axis: the computing time

*e.g., one intuitive result*

$$\begin{array}{l}
 x = (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_{10}) \\
 y = (y_1, y_2, \dots, y_{10})
 \end{array}
 \left. \vphantom{\begin{array}{l} x \\ y \end{array}} \right\} x, y : 100 \rightarrow 7\text{-}8 \text{ seconds (parallelized)}$$

$$\underbrace{\hspace{10em}}_{x_i, y_i \in [1,100]} \quad \downarrow \quad X^{100 \times 10} \cdot Y^{10 \times 100} = XY^{100 \times 100}$$

# Experimental Evaluation



## LetNet-5 Neural Networks

### MNIST dataset

60000 training / 10000 test

### Hyper Parameters Setting

Float Point Precision Setting: 2

-- the # of bits used after the decimal point of a floating point number

-- encoding floating point number  $\rightarrow$  integer number

Bath Size: 64

Learning Rate: 5e-4

*Comparing to baseline:*

-- *achieving similar average batch accuracy*

-- *costing about 14 times training time*

*Note this is result of submitted version.*

*In our follow-up work, we have an efficient implementation of*

*decryption :  $X^{1 \times 25} \cdot Y^{25 \times 1}$  from 40s  $\rightarrow$  0.2ms*

model	epoch 1 (acc)	epoch 2 (acc)	training time
LeNet-5	93.04%	95.48%	4h
CryptoCNN	93.12%	95.49%	57h

# Summary

- CryptoNN framework
  - *Secure multiparty computation based on FE*
  - *CryptoNN framework*
  - *Concrete instance, CryptoCNN*
  - *Evaluation Results*
- Future work
  - *More efficient approaches*
  - *Prevent intermediate model inference attack*
  - *Other NN architecture*



# Thanks

## Q & A